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The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation


Brian D. Cadman


University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Linda Vincent


Northwestern University

August 1, 2011


Abstract:     
Although defined benefit pension plans constitute a significant portion of both annual compensation and firm-related wealth for many CEOs, prior studies of CEO compensation contracts often exclude these plans. Taking advantage of recently increased disclosure requirements, we analyze the role of defined benefit pension plans in these contracts. We find that firms with CEO defined benefit pension plans grant annual compensation that is larger than predicted by economic determinants, suggesting that CEO pension benefits are in addition to other forms of compensation. We also find that more powerful CEOs receive higher total pay and that the annual pension benefit is not sensitive to firm performance. Overall our results suggest that CEO DB pension plans serve as low-risk complements to more risky forms of CEO compensation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Defined Benefit Pension Plans, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, CEO Power, Proxy Disclosure

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: March 14, 2011 ; Last revised: August 11, 2011

Suggested Citation

Cadman, Brian D. and Vincent, Linda , The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation (August 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783866 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1783866

Contact Information

Brian D. Cadman (Contact Author)
University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )
1645 Campus Center Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-9517 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.utah.edu/bio/briancadman
Linda Vincent
Northwestern University ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Accounting & Information Systems
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-2659 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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