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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784322
 
 

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CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion


Nihat Aktas


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Helen Bollaert


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

May 23, 2012

AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
CEO narcissism affects the M&A process. More narcissistic target CEOs obtain higher bid premiums. Acquirer shareholders react less favorably to a takeover announcement when the target CEO is more narcissistic. Among acquiring CEOs, narcissism is associated with initiating deals and negotiating faster. Higher narcissism in both target and acquirer CEOs is associated with a lower probability of deal completion. Our results highlight also the importance of the target to acquirer CEOs relative level of narcissism. To obtain these results, narcissism is measured by the prevalence of personal pronoun usage in more than 1,700 transcripts of CEO speech.

(revised version)

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: mergers and acquisitions, takeover process, CEO, narcissism, hubris, overconfidence

JEL Classification: G34

working papers series


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Date posted: March 14, 2011 ; Last revised: May 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Bollaert, Helen and Roll, Richard, CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion (May 23, 2012). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784322 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1784322

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Helen Bollaert (Contact Author)
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
Campus de Lille
Avenue Willy Brandt, Euralille
Lille, 59777
France
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
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