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CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies
Matthew D. Cain
University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance
Stephen B. McKeon
University of Oregon - Department of Finance
March 20, 2013
Abstract:
This study analyzes the relation between CEO personal risk-taking, managerial risk-taking and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot’s licenses, our proxy for personal risk-taking, are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by CEO pilots have higher equity return volatility, even beyond the amount explained by a wealth effect related to compensation structure. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that non-pecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: risk preferences, mergers, acquisitions, leverage, volatility, sensation seeking
JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34
working papers series
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Date posted: March 15, 2011
; Last revised: March 22, 2013
Suggested CitationCain, Matthew D. and McKeon, Stephen B., CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies (March 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785413
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