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Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls

Harold J. Krent
Chicago-Kent College of Law

Nicholas S. Zeppos
Vanderbilt University School of Law


June 1999


Abstract:     
Each year the government sells or leases assets worth billions of dollars. The impact on the economy is staggering. FCC auctions to allocate rights to electromagnetic spectrum generated well over twenty billion dollars in the last three years. Proceeds from mineral leases, timber sales, and disposition of real estate from defaulting thrifts have generated another several billion dollars annually.

From the taxpayer's perspective, however, government disposition schemes have failed miserably. The government has donated valuable resources to preferred claimants, allocated scarce broadcast and oil rights resources by lottery, and sold both public land and rights to minerals beneath to private parties at a fraction of the market price. The government has also sold timber without any apparent cost-benefit justification, and awarded rights to use electromagnetic spectrum worth billions of dollars to communications giants at a substantial discount.

In the article, we analyze the different causes for regulatory failure -- historical, conceptual, and political -- and argue that reforms at both the congressional and administrative level are need to minimize the inefficiency and graft.

JEL Classifications: H1

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 21, 1999 ; Last revised: October 21, 1999

Suggested Citation

Krent, Harold J. and Zeppos, Nicholas S., Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls (June 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=178548 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.178548


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Contact Information

Harold J. Krent (Contact Author)
Chicago-Kent College of Law ( email )
565 West Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
312-906-5397 (Phone)
312-906-5280 (Fax)
Nicholas S. Zeppos
Vanderbilt University School of Law ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-322-3121 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)
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