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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786391
 
 

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Transparency, Tax Pressure and Access to Finance


Andrew Ellul


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Tullio Jappelli


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF

Marco Pagano


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fausto Panunzi


Bocconi University - Department of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

April 4, 2012

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 332/2012
AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
In choosing transparency, firms must trade off the benefits from better access to finance against the cost of a greater tax burden. We study this trade-off in a model with distortionary taxes and endogenous rationing of external finance. The evidence from two different data sets, one formed only by listed firms and another mainly by unlisted firms, bears out the model’s predictions: First, investment and access to finance are positively correlated with accounting transparency, especially in firms that depend more on external finance, and are negatively correlated with tax pressure. Second, transparency is negatively correlated with tax pressure, particularly in sectors where firms are less dependent on external finance, and is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Finally, financial development enhances the positive effect of transparency on investment, and encourages transparency by financially dependent firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

Keywords: transparency, tax pressure, investment, access to finance

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G38, H25, H26, M40

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Date posted: March 18, 2011 ; Last revised: May 12, 2014

Suggested Citation

Ellul, Andrew and Jappelli, Tullio and Pagano, Marco and Panunzi, Fausto, Transparency, Tax Pressure and Access to Finance (April 4, 2012). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 332/2012; AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786391

Contact Information

Andrew Ellul (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Tullio Jappelli
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/researchers/details/rschcontact.asp?IDENT=106354
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF
84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy
+39 089 963 165 (Phone)
+39 089 963 169 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm
Marco Pagano
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Fausto Panunzi
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
20136 Milan
Italy
+39 02 5836 5327 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5343 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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