Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786492
 
 

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Quasimarket Failure


Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Christopher J. Coyne


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson


George Mason University - Department of Economics

2011

Public Choice, Vol. 149, pp. 209-224, 2011
GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-36

Abstract:     
The efficiency of “quasimarkets” — decentralized public goods provision subjected to Tiebout competition — is a staple of public choice conventional wisdom. Yet in the 1990s a countermovement in political economy called “neoconsolidationism” began to challenge this wisdom. The neoconsolidationists use the logic of government failure central to public choice economics to argue that quasimarkets fail and that jurisdictional consolidation is a superior way to supply public goods and services in metropolitan areas. Public choice scholars have largely ignored the neoconsolidationists’ challenge. This paper brings that challenge to public choice scholars’ attention with the hope of encouraging responses. It also offers some preliminary thoughts about the directions such responses might take.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Private provision, public goods

JEL Classification: B53, H40

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Date posted: March 21, 2011 ; Last revised: February 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Coyne, Christopher J. and Leeson, Peter T., Quasimarket Failure (2011). Public Choice, Vol. 149, pp. 209-224, 2011; GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-36. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786492

Contact Information

Peter J. Boettke
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
Christopher J. Coyne (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Peter T. Leeson
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com
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