Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786927
 


 



Deterring 'Double-Play' Manipulation in Financial Crisis: Increasing Transaction Cost as a Regulatory Tool


Lynn Bai


University of Cincinnati - College of Law

2009

North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2009
U of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 11-05

Abstract:     
The sub-prime mortgage crisis that originated in the United States has triggered a global credit crunch, threatening the solvency of emerging markets that have relied heavily on foreign debt, and resulting in the devaluation of their currencies. Currency market interventions by the central banks in countries with a currency board system lead to higher short-term interest rates and further declinations in the local stock market. This economic setting invites the double-play manipulation strategy that simultaneously attacks both the local currency and the stock market. History has shown that a central bank’s stock market intervention is costly and that sustaining the intervention over a meaningful period of time is a major challenge. In this paper, we examine the effect of a pan-market increase in transaction cost on double-play manipulators’ trading strategies when government intervention is limited to revenues generated by the transaction levy. We show that this regulatory change not only helps sustain equity market intervention but also reduces the short pressure in both the currency and the equity market.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: credit, global, subprime, mortgage, crisis, intervention, double-play, market, currency, equity, stock

JEL Classification: K10, K00, K23

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: March 19, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Bai, Lynn, Deterring 'Double-Play' Manipulation in Financial Crisis: Increasing Transaction Cost as a Regulatory Tool (2009). North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2009; U of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 11-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786927

Contact Information

Lynn Bai (Contact Author)
University of Cincinnati - College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210040
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0040
United States
513-556-0194 (Phone)
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