Abstract

 


 



Why do University Endowments Invest so Much in Risky Assets?


Thomas Gilbert


University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics

Christopher M. Hrdlicka


University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

March 15, 2013


Abstract:     
Maintaining a large endowment invested in risky securities requires a university to forego expansion through internal projects. We capture this trade-off by defining a university objective function that balances the demands of altruistic stakeholders to expand against those of self-interested stakeholders to maximize their lifetime payments. We show that a risky and large endowment signals a combination of three university characteristics: low productivity marginal internal projects; self-interested stakeholders resisting productive expansion; or binding constraints on maximum endowment payouts. Our model demonstrates that endowments offer a window into university fundamentals, and it helps explain the empirical heterogeneity in asset allocations and sizes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: University endowments, portfolio choice, investment policy, governance, agency, UPMIFA

JEL Classification: G11, G32, G23

working papers series


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Date posted: March 19, 2011 ; Last revised: April 17, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gilbert, Thomas and Hrdlicka, Christopher M., Why do University Endowments Invest so Much in Risky Assets? (March 15, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787372 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787372

Contact Information

Thomas Gilbert (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
206-616-7184 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/gilbertt/
Christopher M. Hrdlicka
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
206.616.0332 (Phone)
206.542.7472 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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