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Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress


Per Strömberg


Stockholm School of Economics; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance

Edith S. Hotchkiss


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

David C. Smith


University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

April 7, 2011

AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012

Abstract:     
In order to understand the role of private equity firms in the restructuring of financially distressed firms, we examine the private equity ownership of 2,156 firms which obtained leveraged loan financing between 1997 and 2010. The economic downturn beginning in 2007 is associated with a marked increase in defaults of these highly leveraged companies; approximately 50% of defaults involve PE-backed companies. However, PE-backed firms are no more likely to default during this period than other firms with similar leverage characteristics. But defaulting firms that are private equity backed spend less time in financial distress and are more likely to survive as an independent reorganized company versus being sold to a strategic buyer or liquidated. The ability to restructure more efficiently seems to be affected by the PE sponsor's financial as well as reputational capital. In contrast, recovery rates to junior creditors are lower for PE-backed firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Financial Distress, Bankruptcy, Private Equity, Capital Structure

JEL Classification: G24, G33, G32

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Date posted: March 21, 2011 ; Last revised: March 21, 2012

Suggested Citation

Strömberg, Per Johan, Hotchkiss, Edith S. and Smith, David C., Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress (April 7, 2011). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787446 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787446

Contact Information

Per Johan Stromberg (Contact Author)
Stockholm School of Economics
PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0471 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
Edith S. Hotchkiss
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Department of Finance Fulton Hall, Room 330
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
617-552-3240 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
David Carl Smith
University of Virginia (UVA) - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )
P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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