Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787446
 
 

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Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress


Edith S. Hotchkiss


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Per Strömberg


Swedish House of Finance

David C. Smith


University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

March 13, 2014

AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012

Abstract:     
We examine the role private equity (PE) firms play in the resolution of financial distress using a sample of 2,151 firms that borrow in the leveraged loan market between 1997 and 2010. Controlling for leverage, PE-backed firms are no more likely to default than other leveraged loan borrowers. When firms do default, PE-backed firms restructure more often out of court, restructure faster, and are more likely to remain an independent going concern following the restructuring. PE owners are also more likely to retain control of the firm following the restructuring. The propensity for PE owners to infuse capital as firms approach distress is positively related to measures of the success of the restructuring. Overall, our results show that PE sponsors resolve distress in portfolio firms relatively efficiently.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: Financial Distress, Bankruptcy, Private Equity, Capital Structure

JEL Classification: G24, G33, G32

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Date posted: March 21, 2011 ; Last revised: March 14, 2014

Suggested Citation

Hotchkiss, Edith S. and Strömberg, Per and Smith, David C., Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress (March 13, 2014). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787446 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787446

Contact Information

Edith S. Hotchkiss
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Department of Finance Fulton Hall, Room 330
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
617-552-3240 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
Per Stromberg (Contact Author)
Swedish House of Finance ( email )
Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

David Carl Smith
University of Virginia (UVA) - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )
P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
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