A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks

Leah Chan Grinvald

Suffolk University Law School

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010
Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-07

The well-known marks doctrine presents a conundrum in international trademark law. Although protecting foreign well-known trademarks has been a treaty obligation since 1925, courts around the world, and in the United States and China in particular, do not uniformly apply the doctrine. This lack of uniform protection leads to the question of whether these countries are complying with their international obligations. While brand owners and some commentators would answer this question in the negative, this Article provides a different perspective. This Article offers an alternative approach to answering the compliance question: Before considering the question, one must examine the perspective from which compliance is being assessed. This analysis is important because the perception of compliance depends on the theoretical perspective from which these well-known marks cases are viewed. These theoretical perspectives have thus far been unrecognized, and this Article attempts to bring them to light. In so doing, this Article provides a more nuanced approach to analyze the compliance question, which can ultimately assist in providing better answers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: well-known marks doctrine, Paris Convention, TRIPS, international trademark law, United States, China, comparative law, consumer recognition, compliance, passive perception theory, interactional theory

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Date posted: March 22, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Grinvald, Leah Chan, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010; Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-07. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789097

Contact Information

Leah Chan Grinvald (Contact Author)
Suffolk University Law School ( email )
120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States

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