Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer

Masciandaro, Donato

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1791463

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Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer

Donato Masciandaro

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

March 1, 2011

Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85

Abstract:
In these notes we address the question of Central Bank Independence (hereafter CBI). We use a principal-agent model of the institutional regime. Citizens are the principals who demand CBI and the incumbent government is the agent which establishes the central bank regime, supplying it.

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Date posted: March 26, 2011

Suggested Citation

Masciandaro, Donato, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer (March 1, 2011). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1791463

Contact Information

Donato Masciandaro (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy