Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791463
 
 

Footnotes (1)



 


 



Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer


Donato Masciandaro


Bocconi University - Department of Economics

March 1, 2011

Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85

Abstract:     
In these notes we address the question of Central Bank Independence (hereafter CBI). We use a principal-agent model of the institutional regime. Citizens are the principals who demand CBI and the incumbent government is the agent which establishes the central bank regime, supplying it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 26, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Masciandaro, Donato, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer (March 1, 2011). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1791463

Contact Information

Donato Masciandaro (Contact Author)
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 920
Downloads: 199
Download Rank: 91,735
Footnotes:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.359 seconds