Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791767
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (331)



 


 



Collective Action and the Urban Commons


Sheila Foster


Fordham University School of Law

January 10, 2012

Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 87, p. 57, 2011
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1791767

Abstract:     
Urban residents share access to a number of local resources in which they have a common stake. These resources range from local streets and parks to public spaces to a variety of shared neighborhood amenities. Collectively shared urban resources suffer from the same rivalry and free-riding problems that Garrett Hardin described in his Tragedy of the Commons tale. Scholars have not yet worked up a theory about how this tragedy unfolds in the urban context, particularly in light of existing government regulation and control of common urban resources. This Article argues that the tragedy of the urban commons unfolds during periods of “regulatory slippage” - when the level of local government oversight and management of the resource significantly declines, leaving the resource vulnerable to expanded access by competing users and uses. Overuse or unrestrained competition in the use of these resources can quickly lead to congestion, rivalry and resource degradation. Tales abound in cities across the country of streets, parks, and vacant land that were once thriving urban spaces but have become overrun, dirty, prone to criminal activity, and virtually abandoned by most users.

Proposed solutions to the rivalry, congestion and degradation that afflict common urban resources typically track the traditional public-private dichotomy of governance approaches. These solutions propose either a more assertive central government role or privatization of the resource. Neither of these proposed solutions has taken root, I argue, because of the potential costs that each carry - costs to the local government during times of fiscal strain, costs to communities where the majority of residents are non-property owners, and costs to internal community governance. What has taken root, however, are various forms of cooperative management regimes by groups of users. Despite the robust literature on self-organized management of natural resources, scholars have largely ignored collective action in the urban context. In fact, many urban scholars have assumed that collective action is unlikely in urban communities where social disorder exists.

This Article highlights the ways in which common urban resources are being managed by groups of users in the absence of government coercion or management and without transferring ownership into private hands. This collective action occurs in the shadow of continued state and local government ownership and oversight of the resources. Formally, although the state continues to hold the regulatory reigns, in practice we see the public role shifting away from a centralized governmental role to what I call an “enabling” one in which state and local government provides incentives and lend support to private actors who are able to overcome free-riding and coordination problems to manage collective resources. This Article develops this enabling role, marks its contours and limits, and raises three normative concerns that have gone unattended by policymakers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 78

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 22, 2011 ; Last revised: March 11, 2014

Suggested Citation

Foster, Sheila, Collective Action and the Urban Commons (January 10, 2012). Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 87, p. 57, 2011; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1791767. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791767

Contact Information

Sheila Foster (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
212-636-7771 (Phone)
212-636-6899 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,500
Downloads: 373
Download Rank: 45,281
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  331

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.640 seconds