Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=179182
 
 

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Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes


Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Bruce H. Kobayashi


George Mason University - School of Law


Economics Letters, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 267-272, February 2001
Vanderbilt Law School, Joe C. Davis Working Paper No. 99-13
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-19

Abstract:     
The advantage of the adversarial regime of judicial decision-making is the superior information of the parties while the advantage of an idealized inquisitorial regime is its neutrality. We model the tradeoff by characterizing the properties of costly estimators used by each regime. The adversarial regime uses an ?extremal? estimator that is based on the difference between the most favorable pieces of evidence produced by each party. The inquisitorial regime uses the sample mean. We find that neither regime dominates the other.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

JEL Classification: K41, D83

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Date posted: April 7, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Froeb, Luke and Kobayashi, Bruce H., Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes. Economics Letters, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 267-272, February 2001; Vanderbilt Law School, Joe C. Davis Working Paper No. 99-13; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=179182 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.179182

Contact Information

Luke M. Froeb (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Bruce H. Kobayashi
George Mason University - School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas
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