Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793564
 


 



Preference for the Leader/Follower Roles in a Mixed Duopoly


Ming Hsin Lin


Osaka University of Economics - Faculty of Economics

October 21, 2006


Abstract:     
This paper investigates the preference for the Stackelberg leader/follower roles in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. In contrast to the well known relationship in a private duopoly, we demonstrate that if a firm’s reaction function slopes upward, the firm will always prefer being the leader, whatever the slope of its rival’s reaction function. This holds not only for the public firm but also for the private firm. Furthermore, if both firms have downward-sloping reaction functions, then if one prefers to be the leader, the other must prefer to be the follower.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Mixed duopoly, Stackelberg leader/follower, reaction function

JEL Classification: L00, D00

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Date posted: March 28, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Lin, Ming Hsin, Preference for the Leader/Follower Roles in a Mixed Duopoly (October 21, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793564

Contact Information

Ming Hsin Lin (Contact Author)
Osaka University of Economics - Faculty of Economics ( email )
2-2-8 Osumi
Higashiyokogawa-ku
Osaka
Japan
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