Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793973
 


 



Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care


Keith N. Hylton


William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law

Haizhen Lin


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

April 30, 2013

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-15

Abstract:     
We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, on the level of care. In this model, the injurer’s decision to take care reduces the likelihood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs. The effects of the negligence test depend on the information available to the court, and the manner in which the test is implemented. The key effect of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, is to induce actors to take into account the distribution of the intervention probability as well as its expected value. In the most plausible scenario – where courts have limited information – the test generally leads to socially excessive care.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: negligence, causation, proximate cause, factual causation, ex post negligence, optimal care

JEL Classification: D81, K00, K13, K41

working papers series


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Date posted: March 29, 2011 ; Last revised: May 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Lin, Haizhen, Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care (April 30, 2013). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793973

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
Haizhen Lin
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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