|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Bank Risk-Taking Abroad: Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter?Steven OngenaTilburg University Alexander A. PopovEuropean Central Bank (ECB) Gregory F. UdellIndiana University Bloomington - Department of Finance February 24, 2011 European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2011-007 Tilburg University CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-032 Abstract: This paper provides the first empirical evidence on how home-country regulation and supervision affects bank risk-taking in host-country markets. We analyze lending by 136 banks to 8,253 firms in 1,513 different localities across 13 countries. We find strong evidence that laxer regulatory restrictions in the home country are associated with higher loan rejection rates by banks in host-country markets, but that the resulting loans are mostly to small, unaudited, nonexporting, and innovative firms. The results are stronger when banks are less efficiently supervised at home, and they are observed independently from the effect that bank balance sheets have on lending. These findings imply that loose home-country regulation and supervision are associated with important negative externalities for the host-country in terms of more risk-taking by cross-border banks.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50 Keywords: bank regulation, cross-border nancial institutions, financial risk JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32 working papers seriesDate posted: March 26, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.594 seconds
