Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1794879
 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Competitive Pressure and the Adoption of Complementary Innovations


Tobias Kretschmer


Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Eugenio J. Miravete


University of Texas at Austin; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

José C. Pernías


Jaume I University - Department of Economics

March 2011

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8289

Abstract:     
Liberalization of the European automobile distribution system in 2002 limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints, leading to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers. We estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the elimination of exclusive territories. Using French data we evaluate the existence of complementarities between the adoption of software applications and the scale of production. Firms view these innovations as substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they expand their scale of production. Results are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Competitive Pressure, Complementarity, Product and Process Innovation

JEL Classification: C35, L86, O31

working papers series


Date posted: March 28, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Kretschmer, Tobias and Miravete, Eugenio J. and Pernías, José C., Competitive Pressure and the Adoption of Complementary Innovations (March 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8289. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1794879

Contact Information

Tobias Kretschmer (Contact Author)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )
Kaulbachstr. 45
Munich, 80539
Germany
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Eugenio J. Miravete
University of Texas at Austin ( email )
Department of Economics
1 University Station C3100
Austin, TX 78712-0301
United States
512-232-1718 (Phone)
512-471-3510 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/facstaff/Miravete
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
José C. Pernías
Jaume I University - Department of Economics ( email )
Campus del Riu Sec.
E-12071 Castellon
Spain
34 96 472 8610 (Phone)
34 96 472 8591 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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