Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796063
 
 

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Can Public Nuisance Law Protect Your Neighborhood from Big Banks?


Kermit J. Lind


Cleveland State University

January 10, 2011

Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 89, 2011

Abstract:     
One manifestation of the mortgage crisis of the past decade is the destabilization of housing markets and neighborhoods where mortgage defaults were concentrated. As banks and their mortgage servicers employ business practices that result in banks or their agents controlling or owning vacant dwellings, the noncompliance with housing and other municipal codes by these institutional absentee owners presents neighborhoods and cities with a huge and costly public nuisance problem.

This article explores both the theory of public nuisance law and the experience of applying nuisance law in practice to mitigate the harmful consequences of bank debt collection and REO management. It looks at how and to what extent public nuisance law provides protection for those non-defaulting homeowners whose health, safety and welfare are threatened by the business practices of big banks. It compares litigation that applies public nuisance law in different ways to distinguish viable uses from unsuccessful uses of public nuisance law doctrine. The recent efforts to use public nuisance law against manufacturers and marketers of harmful products like guns and tobacco are distinguished from the application of public nuisance law against owners of real estate maintenance deficiencies are in violation of laws protecting the public health, safety and welfare.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: public nuisance, mortgage crisis, REO property, mortgage servicing, housing code enforcement

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Date posted: March 27, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Lind, Kermit J., Can Public Nuisance Law Protect Your Neighborhood from Big Banks? (January 10, 2011). Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 89, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796063

Contact Information

Kermit Lind (Contact Author)
Cleveland State University ( email )
2121 Euclid Avenue, LB 138
Cleveland, OH 44115-2214
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.csuohio.edu
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