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Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries


Sophia J. W. Hamm


Ohio State University (OSU) - Fisher College of Business

Michael J. Jung


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law

Clare Wang


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

May 3, 2013


Abstract:     
We examine the determinants and consequences of CEOs accepting a $1 salary, a high-profile compensation practice debated by regulators, investors, and the business press. Using a hand-collected sample of 92 CEOs from 90 firms between 1993 and 2011, we document two distinct categories of CEOs: those opting into a compensation agreement that aims to better align CEO and shareholder interests, and those attempting to show sacrifice during a difficult time for the firm. A commonality between both categories is that many of the CEOs are also the chairman of the board, a founder of the firm, or both. However, the major differences are that CEOs in the first category, on average, receive more stock options, and stock returns after the $1 salary decisions are generally higher for firms in the first category, benefitting the CEOs (in terms of in-the-money options) and shareholders. Our analyses shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported on both sides only by anecdotal evidence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: One dollar salary, CEO compensation, CEO salary

JEL Classification: M41, J33, G30, G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: March 27, 2011 ; Last revised: May 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Hamm, Sophia J. W., Jung, Michael J. and Wang, Clare, Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries (May 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1796403

Contact Information

Sophia J. W. Hamm
Ohio State University (OSU) - Fisher College of Business ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
614-292-2529 (Phone)

Michael J. Jung (Contact Author)
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
212-998-0193 (Phone)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law
40 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
Clare Wang
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847 491 2670 (Phone)
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