Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797066
 


 



Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws


D. Gordon Smith


Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School

Matthew G. Wright


Linklaters

Marcus Kai Hintze


affiliation not provided to SSRN

March 26, 2011

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 80, p. 125, 2011

Abstract:     
In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: shareholder empowerment, shareholder bylaws, corporate governance, private ordering, Delaware corporations, Rule 14a-8

JEL Classification: G34, K12, K22, L14, L22


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Date posted: March 29, 2011 ; Last revised: June 10, 2015

Suggested Citation

Smith, D. Gordon and Wright, Matthew G. and Hintze, Marcus Kai, Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws (March 26, 2011). Fordham Law Review, Vol. 80, p. 125, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797066

Contact Information

Gordon Smith (Contact Author)
Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )
422 JRCB
Provo, UT 84602
United States
801.422.3233 (Phone)
801.422.0390 (Fax)
Matthew G. Wright
Linklaters ( email )
United States
Marcus Kai Hintze
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Feedback to SSRN


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