‘Custody’ in Custody: Redefining Miranda Rights in Prison

Abstract:     
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that, in order to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, police must inform suspects of their ‘Miranda Rights’ when subjecting them to a custodial interrogation. Courts normally determine custody for Miranda purposes by asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. But what happens when suspects are in prison and cannot leave? When is someone who is in custody “in custody”? That is a question that the Supreme Court has explicitly refused to answer, until now. Recently, in Howes v. Fields, the Sixth Circuit took a bright line approach to defining ‘custody’ in custodial settings, ruling that when police separate inmates from the general population and question them regarding an incident occurring outside the prison, the inmate is per se “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.

This Note argues that the Supreme Court should create a bright line rule, requiring law enforcement to read inmates their Miranda rights when police move inmates from the general population and isolated for the purpose of interrogating them regarding a crime that occurred outside the prison, by affirming the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Howes v. Fields. Part II examines the application of Miranda in custodial settings and explores the circuit split created by Fields. Part III argues that the Fields holding should be affirmed because separating inmates from the general population satisfies the coercive pressure and restraint on movement necessary to trigger Miranda protections.

Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes that the bright line rule articulated in Fields is necessary to safeguard the rights of inmates, and should be affirmed by the Supreme Court in order to provide more guidance to the courts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Criminal Procedure, Miranda, Fifth Amendement, Mathis, Cervantes, Fields, Prison, Shatzer

Accepted Paper Series