Airline Alliances with Low Cost Carriers
Faculty of Economics, Meijo University
Ming Hsin Lin
Osaka University of Economics - Faculty of Economics
March 24, 2011
A major carrier operates one hub linking multiple non-hub cities. It forms an alliance with a low cost carrier whose nonstop service competes with its one-stop service. The alliance’s joint profit is maximized by withdrawing the competing one-stop (nonstop) service when the major carrier’s operating cost and connecting passengers’ hub-through additional time costs are large (small). The realized alliance is welfare-improving (welfare-decreasing) when these costs are large or small (intermediate). These findings suggest the necessity of alliance regulation. In some regions, the necessity of regulation does not monotonically change as the network size increases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Codeshare alliances, Hub-spoke network carriers, Low cost carriers, Antitrust immunity, Schedule competition
JEL Classification: L13, L93
Date posted: March 30, 2011
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