Abstract

 


 



The ancestral logic of politics: Upper body strength regulates men’s assertion of self-interest over economic redistribution


Michael Bang Petersen


University of Aarhus - Department of Political Science

Daniel Sznycer


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Aaron Sell


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Leda Cosmides


University of California, Santa Barbara

John Tooby


affiliation not provided to SSRN

October 15, 2012


Abstract:     
Over human evolutionary history, upper body strength has been a major component of fighting ability. Evolutionary models of animal conflict predict that actors with greater fighting ability will more actively attempt to acquire or defend resources than less formidable contestants. Here, we apply these models to political decision-making about redistribution of income and wealth among modern humans. In studies conducted in Argentina, Denmark and the U.S., men with greater upper body strength more strongly endorsed the self-beneficial position: Among men of lower socioeconomic status (SES), strength predicted increased support for redistribution; among men of higher SES, strength predicted increased opposition to redistribution. As personal upper body strength is irrelevant to payoffs from economic policies in modern mass democracies, the continuing role of strength suggests that modern political decision-making is shaped by an evolved psychology designed for small-scale groups.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: Formidability, asymmetric contests, humans, sex, redistribution

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Date posted: March 31, 2011 ; Last revised: October 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Petersen, Michael Bang, Sznycer, Daniel, Sell, Aaron, Cosmides, Leda and Tooby, John, The ancestral logic of politics: Upper body strength regulates men’s assertion of self-interest over economic redistribution (October 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798773 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1798773

Contact Information

Michael Bang Petersen (Contact Author)
University of Aarhus - Department of Political Science ( email )
Bartholins Allé è
DK-8000 Aarhus, 8000
Denmark
Daniel Sznycer
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Aaron Sell
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Leda Cosmides
University of California, Santa Barbara ( email )
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
John Tooby
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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