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Revenues from a Possible Spectrum Incentive Auction: Why the CTIA/CEA Estimate is Not Reliable


Jeffrey A. Eisenach


Navigant Economics LLC; George Mason University School of Law

March 31, 2011


Abstract:     
Efforts to estimate revenues from future spectrum auctions are fraught with difficulties. Revenues depend heavily on specific auction characteristics, such as bidding structures and the geographic features of the licenses at auction, making it difficult to use past results to predict future outcomes. Predicting revenues from incentive auctions raises even greater challenges, since the net revenues received by the government depend on the nature and magnitude of the “incentives” offered to current licensees. Based on the information currently available about the FCC’s proposal to use incentive auctions to repurpose spectrum for mobile wireless use, the revenues that might be produced by such an auction are unknowable with any degree of precision.

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Date posted: April 2, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Eisenach, Jeffrey A., Revenues from a Possible Spectrum Incentive Auction: Why the CTIA/CEA Estimate is Not Reliable (March 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800132 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1800132

Contact Information

Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)
Navigant Economics LLC ( email )
1200 19th St. NW
Suite 850
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-448-9029 (Phone)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
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