Abstract

 


 



Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims


Daniel Lyons


Boston College - Law School

March 31, 2011

The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 823-845, Summer 2011
Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 222

Abstract:     
Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress. The FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific statutory authorization. But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in the statutes that they administer.

This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over broadband. For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme. As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from Congress.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: regulation, deregulation, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc.

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 3, 2011 ; Last revised: February 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Lyons, Daniel, Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims (March 31, 2011). The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 823-845, Summer 2011; Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 222. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800209

Contact Information

Daniel Lyons (Contact Author)
Boston College - Law School ( email )
885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 558
Downloads: 79
Download Rank: 157,747

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.360 seconds