Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805141
 
 

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The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency


Nuno M. Garoupa


University of Illinois College of Law

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law

April 7, 2011

Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2012
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-16

Abstract:     
The efficiency of the common law hypothesis has generated a large bulk of literature in the last decades. The main argument is that there is an implicit economic logic to the common law; the doctrines in common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives which induce efficient behavior.

We start by observing that if the common law is overall evolutionarily efficient, we are left with no explanation for the important doctrinal differences across common law jurisdictions. The observation is more striking if we keep in mind that presumably the de jure initial condition was the same, namely English law.

This paper assesses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis to detect the possible explanations for those main differences. If local determinants shape the common law differently, the literature needs to address these particularities that have been largely ignored. The consequence is that there is probably no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the "one-size-fits-all" theory of the legal origins literature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: April 17, 2011 ; Last revised: May 19, 2011

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno M. and Gómez Ligüerre, Carlos, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency (April 7, 2011). Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2012; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1805141

Contact Information

Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/
Carlos Gómez Ligüerre
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
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