|
||||
|
||||
School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test ScoresJishnu DasWorld Bank - Development Economics Research Group (DECRG) Stefan DerconUniversity of Oxford - Department of Economics James P. HabyarimanaGeorgetown University; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Pramila KrishnanUniversity of Oxford - Department of Economics Karthik MuralidharanUniversity of California, San Diego (UCSD) Venkatesh SundararamanWorld Bank April 1, 2011 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5629 Abstract: Empirical studies of the relationship between school inputs and test scores typically do not account for the fact that households will respond to changes in school inputs. This paper presents a dynamic household optimization model relating test scores to school and household inputs, and tests its predictions in two very different low-income country settings -- Zambia and India. The authors measure household spending changes and student test score gains in response to unanticipated as well as anticipated changes in school funding. Consistent with the optimization model, they find in both settings that households offset anticipated grants more than unanticipated grants. They also find that unanticipated school grants lead to significant improvements in student test scores but anticipated grants have no impact on test scores. The results suggest that naïve estimates of public education spending on learning outcomes that do not account for optimal household responses are likely to be considerably biased if used to estimate parameters of an education production function.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44 Keywords: Tertiary Education, Education For All, Access to Finance, Teaching and Learning, Disability working papers seriesDate posted: April 11, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds