Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III
Wulf A. Kaal
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota - School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
April 9, 2011
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44, p. 389, 2011
This Article is a rejoinder to a comment by Professor Romano on an earlier paper I coauthored with Christian Kirchner. Professor Romano suggests regulatory arbitrage, rather than the targeted regulation of bank lending to hedge funds under Basel III, as a hedge against systemic failure. I contend that it was not harmonization through Basel II but rather the profitability of certain assets and business strategies that caused banks to hold similar assets and engage in similar strategies. In particular, I find that the increasing role of hedge funds in the credit derivatives market, in combination with the market’s recent failure, suggests that an increased emphasis on banks’ lending exposure to hedge funds could be justified. Using the methodological approach of New Institutional Economics, I evaluate recent regulatory changes, including the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, the AIFM Directive, and other pertinent regulation. I provide an impact analysis of regulatory changes, de lege lata and de lege ferenda, with a special emphasis on, and historical analysis of, hedge fund registration rules and asymmetric regulation in Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 75
Keywords: Basel III, Hedge Funds, Institutional Economics, Moral Hazard, Systemic Risk, Credit Derivatives, Harmonization, Bank Regulation
JEL Classification: K22, G1, G2, G3, F3, B25
Date posted: April 10, 2011
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 1.219 seconds