|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Comment on ‘Promises and Partnership’Cary A. DeckUniversity of Arkansas - Department of Economics Maroš ServátkaUniversity of Canterbury - New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory Steven James TuckerUniversity of Waikato Management School - Economics April 11, 2011 Abstract: Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14 Keywords: Experiment, Promises, Partnership, Guilt Aversion, Psychological Game Theory, Trust, Lies, Social Distance, Behavioral Economics, Hidden Action JEL Classification: C70, C91 working papers seriesDate posted: May 12, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.407 seconds
