Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808140
 
 

Citations



 


 



Domestic Income Shifting by Chinese Listed Firms


Terry J. Shevlin


University of California-Irvine

Tanya Y. H. Tang


The University of British Columbia - Faculty of Management

Ryan J. Wilson


University of Oregon - Lundquist College of Business

April 12, 2011

The Journal of the American Taxation Association, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
To encourage economic development in specific regions and industries, the Chinese Central and local governments offer a series of corporate income tax incentives (tax exemptions, reduced tax rates, tax holidays and tax refunds). In China, parent and subsidiary companies are consolidated for financial reporting, but not tax, purposes. We take advantage of a unique disclosure in the tax footnotes of Chinese listed firms to examine income shifting among consolidated group members in response to these incentives. We find that intangible intensive groups (“firms”) and firms concerned with meeting minimum earnings thresholds to issue equity shift greater amounts of income. We find no evidence that high concentrations of either Central or local government ownership affect the level of income shifting.

Keywords: Income Shifting, Tax Avoidance, Chinese Listed Firms, Intangibles, Equity Issuance

JEL Classification: H25, H26

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: April 14, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Shevlin, Terry J. and Tang, Tanya Y. H. and Wilson, Ryan J., Domestic Income Shifting by Chinese Listed Firms (April 12, 2011). The Journal of the American Taxation Association, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808140

Contact Information

Terry J. Shevlin (Contact Author)
University of California-Irvine ( email )
Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
206-550-9891 (Phone)
Tanya Y. H. Tang
The University of British Columbia - Faculty of Management ( email )
3333 University way
Kelowna, BC V1V1V7
Canada
Ryan J. Wilson
University of Oregon - Lundquist College of Business ( email )
1280 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
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