Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808429
 


 



A Two-Country Game of Competition Policies


Makoto Yano


Keio University - Faculty of Economics

Takakazu Honryo


Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Economics Department


Review of International Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 207-218, 2011

Abstract:     
Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms-of-trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff-war-like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 13, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Yano, Makoto and Honryo, Takakazu, A Two-Country Game of Competition Policies. Review of International Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 207-218, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808429 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00941.x

Contact Information

Makoto Yano (Contact Author)
Keio University - Faculty of Economics ( email )
2-15-45 Mita, Ninato-ku
Tokyo 1088345
Japan
+81 3 3798 7480 (Fax)
Takakazu Honryo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Economics Department ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: https://directory.columbia.edu/people/search?filter.searchTerm=Takakazu%20Honryo
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