Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809677
 
 

References (72)



 


 



Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan


Andrew Beath


World Bank - East Asia and Pacific Region

Fotini Christia


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science

Ruben Enikolopov


Institute of Political Economy and Governance; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School; Barcelona GSE

September 8, 2016

MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14

Abstract:     
In countries affected by insurgencies, development programs may potentially reduce violence by improving economic outcomes and increasing popular support for the government. In this paper, we test the efficacy of this approach through a large-scale randomized controlled trial of the largest development program in Afghanistan at the height of the Taliban insurgency. We find that the program generally improved economic outcomes, increased support for the government, and reduced insurgent violence. However, in areas close to the Pakistani border, the program did not increase support for the government and actually increased insurgent violence. This heterogeneity in treatment effects appears to be due to differences between districts in the degree of infiltration by external insurgents, who are not reliant on the local population for support. The results suggest that while development programs can quell locally-based insurgencies, such programs may be counterproductive when implemented in areas where insurgents are not embedded in the local population.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: onflict; development; aid; field experiment; Afghanistan

JEL Classification: D74, F35, I38, O15, O18, O19


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 19, 2011 ; Last revised: September 23, 2016

Suggested Citation

Beath, Andrew and Christia, Fotini and Enikolopov, Ruben, Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan (September 8, 2016). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1809677

Contact Information

Andrew Beath
World Bank - East Asia and Pacific Region ( email )
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Fotini Christia (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science ( email )
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

Ruben Enikolopov
Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
ICREA ( email )
Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Barcelona GSE ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,146
Downloads: 1,755
Download Rank: 6,146
References:  72

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.266 seconds