Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809677
 
 

References (40)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan


Andrew Beath


World Bank

Fotini Christia


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Ruben Enikolopov


Institute for Political Economy and Governance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School

April 13, 2012

MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14

Abstract:     
Development programs have been increasingly used not only as an instrument for economic and political development, but also as a tool for counter-insurgency. Using a large-scale randomized field experiment in Afghanistan, we explore whether the inclusion of villages in the country’s largest development program alters perceptions of well-being, attitudes towards the government, and levels of security in surrounding areas. We find that the program has a positive effect on all three measures in relatively secure regions, but no effect on attitudes and security in areas with high levels of initial violence, suggesting that a certain minimum threshold of security has to be in place for the provision of goods and services to have an effect on improving attitudes towards the government and reducing violence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: conflict, field experiment, Afghanistan

JEL Classification: F51, H43, H56

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 19, 2011 ; Last revised: April 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Beath, Andrew and Christia, Fotini and Enikolopov, Ruben, Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan (April 13, 2012). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1809677

Contact Information

Andrew Beath
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Fotini Christia (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
Ruben Enikolopov
Institute for Political Economy and Governance ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,237
Downloads: 1,134
Download Rank: 9,207
References:  40
Citations:  4

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds