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Who Stands at the Top and Bottom of the Slippery Slope?


Tim Brown


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy

Kristina M. Rennekamp


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy

Nicholas Seybert


University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

Wenjie Zhu


University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

June 15, 2011


Abstract:     
Prior research argues that sequential decisions lead to a slippery slope toward wrongdoing, with little evidence to support such claims. We conduct two experiments which demonstrate the existence of the slippery slope in a controlled setting, and investigate whether it leads “good people” to do “bad things.” Our first experiment manipulates whether the potential for wrongdoing sequentially increases or decreases. We find that low-Machiavellians commit larger cumulative wrongdoing when the opportunities are increasing in magnitude, consistent with slippery slope behavior. High-Machiavellians are less susceptible to slippery slope behavior. Our second experiment replicates these results for a more unethical decision, and shows that low-Machiavellian participants who engage in slippery slope behavior undergo a change in beliefs about the appropriateness of engaging in wrongdoing. Our study confirms the slippery slope toward misconduct, suggests that cognitive dissonance is likely to play a role in the phenomenon, and highlights differences in susceptibility across individuals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: slippery slope, misconduct, fraud, cognitive dissonance, Machiavellian, ethics

JEL Classification: M00, K00, K20, M10, M14, M40, M41

working papers series


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Date posted: April 16, 2011 ; Last revised: June 23, 2012

Suggested Citation

Brown, Tim, Rennekamp, Kristina M., Seybert, Nicholas and Zhu, Wenjie, Who Stands at the Top and Bottom of the Slippery Slope? (June 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810833 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1810833

Contact Information

Tim Brown
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Kristina M. Rennekamp
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy ( email )
4007 BIF
515 E. Gregory
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Nicholas Seybert (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States
Wenjie Zhu
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States
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