Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811180
 
 

Footnotes (248)



 


 



Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era of Private Governance


Aaron Cooper


Georgetown University Law Center

April 15, 2011

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 1431-1468, 2011

Abstract:     
Judicial interpretation of regulatory standards generally relies on the presumption that agencies are politically accountable and democratically “appointed” actors. As a result, courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. This presumption, however, is severely outdated. The regulatory arena is replete with the privatization of regulatory decision making, which puts the current approach to agency deference in question. This Note seeks to address the changing nature of the regulatory framework by suggesting a modification of agency deference doctrine that accounts for the increasingly active role played by private parties in public governance. In proposing a new framework for agency deference in cases of private delegation, the Note explores parallels between agency deference and the non-delegation doctrine, addresses the relationship of agency deference to the separation of powers and the fragmentation of the political branches, and seeks to reinstate the judiciary as a primary expositor of statutory meaning in the private delegation context.

NOTE: published version now uploaded

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Chevron, Deference, Privatization, Regulation, Agency

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 18, 2011 ; Last revised: July 20, 2011

Suggested Citation

Cooper, Aaron, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era of Private Governance (April 15, 2011). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 1431-1468, 2011 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811180

Contact Information

Aaron Cooper (Contact Author)
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 919
Downloads: 137
Download Rank: 124,314
Footnotes:  248

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 2.313 seconds