Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
April 15, 2011
NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-02
We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price discrimination but no exclusive contracts; and (iv) no regulation: the network operator can sell exclusive rights to content providers. We compare the equilibrium outcomes explicitly accounting for dynamic incentives to invest in improving the Quality of Service offered to each content provider. We provide a ranking Quality of Service and network operator profits across regimes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Network Neutrality, Internet Price Discrimination, Exclusivity, Quality of Service, Network Management, Network Effects, Congestion, AT&T, Verizon, Google
JEL Classification: L10, D40, L12, L13, C63, D42, D43working papers series
Date posted: April 20, 2011
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