How Nations Share
McGill University - Faculty of Law
April 19, 2011
Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 87, 2011
Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1159
Every nation has an interest in sharing the gains they help create by participating in globalization. If governments fail to claim an adequate share of these gains, they will be forced to look ever more intensely to personal taxes on their own already-burdened citizens. Yet because of the structure of law and the mechanisms of legal decision-making in this area, it is all but impossible to observe how, and how much, governments are in fact claiming. This article shows that to date, excessive protection of taxpayer confidentiality has led to obscurity and minimization of hard law and a network of abstraction through soft law as its faulty and inadequate replacement. It argues that this paradigm serves the political goals of special interest groups at a high social cost. It concludes that at a time when national economic and political fortunes are experiencing high stress, uncertainty and volatility, we need much better information about how international tax law develops and works in practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: international law, diplomacy, dispute resolution, tax treaties, competent authority, tax policy, profit allocation, transfer pricing, soft law, hard law, global governance
JEL Classification: E63, H2, F02, H87, K33, K34, K41, N40, P45, H10, H20, H11, H21, H26, H87, F00, F20, F23, F50, F51, Fworking papers series
Date posted: April 21, 2011 ; Last revised: April 24, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.422 seconds