Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=181570
 
 

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Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas


Thomas D. Jeitschko


Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Elmar Wolfstetter


Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce

March 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 258

Abstract:     
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

JEL Classification: D44

working papers series


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Date posted: October 29, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar, Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas (March 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 258. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=181570

Contact Information

Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/
Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/
Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )
Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea
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