Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Pierre M. Picard
Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée (CREA); Universite du Luxembourg
Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School; Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8338
The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent office that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41
Keywords: intellectual property, Patent system, public firm organization, quality
JEL Classification: L30, O30, O31, O34, O38
Date posted: April 20, 2011
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