Abstract

 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?


Bernardo Bortolotti


Università di Torino

Carlo Cambini


Polytechnic University of Turin

Laura Rondi


Politecnico di Torino - Faculty of Engineering; CERIS-CNR

Yossi Spiegel


Tel Aviv University - The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration

Summer 2011

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 20, Issue 2, pp. 517-564, 2011

Abstract:     
We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 21, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Bortolotti, Bernardo, Cambini, Carlo, Rondi, Laura and Spiegel, Yossi, Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter? (Summer 2011). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 20, Issue 2, pp. 517-564, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1817175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00296.x

Contact Information

Bernardo Bortolotti (Contact Author)
Università di Torino ( email )
Corso Unione Sovietica, 218 bis
10134 Torino, 13820-4020
Italy
+39 02 52036931 (Phone)
+39 02 52036946 (Fax)
Carlo Cambini
Polytechnic University of Turin ( email )
Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24
Torino, 10129
Italy
Laura Rondi
Politecnico di Torino - Faculty of Engineering ( email )
DISPEA
Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24
Torino, 10129
Italy
+39 011 5647232 (Phone)
CERIS-CNR
Via Real Collegio, 30
Moncalieri (TO), 10024
Italy
Yossi Spiegel
Tel Aviv University - The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration ( email )
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-9063 (Phone)
972-3-640-7739 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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