Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820623
 
 

References (16)



 
 

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Why Not One Big Database? Principles for Data Ownership


Marshall W. Van Alstyne


Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School

Erik Brynjolfsson


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Stuart Madnick


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

April 23, 1995

Decision Support Systems, Vol. 15, pp. 267-284, 1995
MIT Sloan Research Paper

Abstract:     
This research addresses incentive principles that drive information sharing and affect database value. Many real world centralization and standardization efforts have failed, typically because departments lacked incentives or needed greater local autonomy. While intangible factors such as "ownership" have been described as key to providing incentives, these soft issues have largely eluded formal characterization. Using an incomplete contracts approach from economics, we model the costs and benefits of reorganizing control, including intangible factors, by explicitly considering the role of data "ownership." There are two principal benefits of this approach. First, it defines mathematically precise terms for analyzing incentive costs and benefits of differing control rights. Second, this theoretical framework leads to development of seven normative principles for improved database design. These principles offer guidance for outsourcing, decentralizing control, and standardization. Applications are illustrated through case histories.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Distributed Database Design, Incomplete Contracts, Centralization, Decentralization, Standards, Outsourcing, Converters, Economic Models

JEL Classification: C72, C79, D83. M11

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: April 25, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Van Alstyne, Marshall W. and Brynjolfsson, Erik and Madnick, Stuart, Why Not One Big Database? Principles for Data Ownership (April 23, 1995). Decision Support Systems, Vol. 15, pp. 267-284, 1995; MIT Sloan Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820623

Contact Information

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author)
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://smgapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School ( email )
Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html
Erik Brynjolfsson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E53-313
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-4319 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://digital.mit.edu/erik
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stuart E. Madnick
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E53-321
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6671 (Phone)
617-253-3321 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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