Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823247
 
 

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A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition


Alexander Kemnitz


Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

April 26, 2011


Abstract:     
This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Health Care Reform, Competition, Consumer Choice

JEL Classification: I11, I18, D43

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Date posted: April 27, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Kemnitz, Alexander, A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition (April 26, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1823247

Contact Information

Alexander Kemnitz (Contact Author)
Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )
Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany
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