Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825045
 
 

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Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research Spill-Overs and The Incentive to Innovate


Vincenzo Denicolò


University of Bologna

Luigi A. Franzoni


University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics

October 30, 2010

American Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We investigate the conditions for the desirability of exclusive intellectual property rights for innovators, as opposed to weak rights allowing for some degree of imitation and ex-post competition. The comparison between the two alternatives reduces to a specific "ratio test," which suggests that strong, exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spill-overs are small.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: innovation, exclusive rights, patents, trade secrets, spill-overs

JEL Classification: K1, D4, L4

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Date posted: April 30, 2011 ; Last revised: January 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Denicolò, Vincenzo and Franzoni, Luigi A., Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research Spill-Overs and The Incentive to Innovate (October 30, 2010). American Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825045

Contact Information

Vincenzo Denicolo
University of Bologna ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Luigi Alberto Franzoni (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
40126 Bologna
Italy
IT-051-2098488 (Phone)
IT-051-221968 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.unibo.it/docenti/luigi.franzoni
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