What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory
Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown University Law Center
April 28, 2011
Debates over “originalism” have been a central focus of contemporary constitutional theory for three decades. One of the features of this debate has been disagreement about what “originalism” is. More worrisome is the possibility that the arguments between contemporary originalists and their opponents, the “living constitutionalists”, are confused – with each side of the debate making erroneous assumptions about the content of their opponent’s theories.
The aim of this chapter is to clarify these debates by providing a history of contemporary originalism and then developing an account of the core or focal content of originalist theory. The history reveals that contemporary originalist theory has evolved – the mainstream of originalist theory began with an emphasis on the original intentions of the framers but has gradually moved to the view that the “original meaning” of the constitution is the “original public meaning” of the text. Even today, originalists disagree among themselves about a variety of important questions, including the normative justification for a constitutional practice that adheres to original meaning. Despite evolution and continued disagreement, however, contemporary originalist theory has a core of agreement on two propositions. First, almost all originalists agree that the linguistic meaning of each constitutional provision was fixed at the time that provision was adopted. Second, originalists agree that our constitutional practice both is (albeit imperfectly) and should be committed to the principle that the original meaning of the Constitution constrains judicial practice.
The question whether living constitutionalists actually disagree with these core principles of originalist theory is a complex one. On one interpretation, living constitutionalism and originalism are (mostly) compatible: the constitution lives inside the “construction zone,” the boundaries of which are marked by the original meaning of the text. On another interpretation, living constitutionalism is incompatible with originalism: living constitutional doctrine and practices can override even original meaning of the text, even when that meaning is clear.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41working papers series
Date posted: May 2, 2011
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