References (51)



Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations

Julien Sauvagnat

Toulouse School of Economics

September 2013

This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms' uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak. More generally, I show that offering full leniency allows the Competition Authority to open more successful investigations (what I refer to as the `activism effect' of leniency), which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Antitrust Law and Policies, Cartels, Collusion, Self-Reporting

JEL Classification: K42, K21, L41

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Date posted: May 2, 2011 ; Last revised: November 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Sauvagnat, Julien, Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations (September 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1826324

Contact Information

Julien Sauvagnat (Contact Author)
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
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References:  51

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