Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826324
 
 

References (51)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Prosecution and Leniency Programs: A Fool's Game


Julien Sauvagnat


Toulouse School of Economics

September 16, 2010


Abstract:     
We present a model in which the Antitrust Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. We show that the Antitrust Authority can then obtain confessions even when it has no chance of finding hard evidence. More generally, offering leniency raises the conviction rate, which in turn enhances cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. We also show that the optimal leniency scheme involves a single informant rule. That is, amnesty should be given only when a single cartel member reports information. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of the model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Antitrust Law and Policies, Cartels, Collusion, Self-Reporting

JEL Classification: K42, K21, L41

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 2, 2011 ; Last revised: November 22, 2013

Suggested Citation

Sauvagnat, Julien, Prosecution and Leniency Programs: A Fool's Game (September 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1826324

Contact Information

Julien Sauvagnat (Contact Author)
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 676
Downloads: 158
Download Rank: 105,136
References:  51
Citations:  1
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence
By Gordon Klein

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.281 seconds