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An Experimental Investigation of Article 82 Rebate SchemesFrank P. Maier-RigaudIESEG School of Management, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; Lille - Economics & Management (LEM) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Competition Division; European Commission, DG Competition; Laboratory for Experimental Economics, University of Bonn; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Martin BeckenkampMax Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods May 1, 2011 Competition Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1-31, 2006 Abstract: We conduct an experiment to test standard theoretical predictions concerning switching behavior in a rebate and a discount scheme. Beyond theoretical expectations we find that rebate and discount schemes exert a significant attraction that enhances the potentially exclusionary effect of the schemes. From a competition policy perspective this is an important result because it emphasizes that it may be crucial to analyze to what extent firms deviate predictably from decision patterns prescribed by standard economic theory. Competition policy cannot afford to neglect the possibility of boundedly rational firms deviating systematically from standard theoretical predictions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 Keywords: rebates, discounts, antitrust, Article 102, Article 82, experiment, behavioral economics, competition policy Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: May 2, 2011 ; Last revised: May 5, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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