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The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit and Closet Indexing, Fees, and Performance


Martijn Cremers


University of Notre Dame

Miguel A. Ferreira


Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pedro P. Matos


University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Laura T. Starks


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

February 13, 2013


Abstract:     
We examine the causes and consequences of indexing for active management by equity mutual funds worldwide. Explicit indexing is rare in countries with weaker regulation and less liquid stock markets, but many actively managed funds engage in closet indexing. We find that funds are more active and charge lower fees when they face more competitive pressure from explicitly indexed funds. Moreover, truly active funds generate higher risk-adjusted net returns than closet indexers. Overall, we conclude that explicit indexing improves the levels of competition and efficiency of the mutual fund industry in a country.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 71

Keywords: Mutual funds, Active management, Index funds, Exchange-traded funds, Competition, Fees, Performance

JEL Classification: G15, G18, G23

working papers series


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Date posted: May 3, 2011 ; Last revised: February 20, 2013

Suggested Citation

Cremers, Martijn, Ferreira, Miguel A., Matos, Pedro P. and Starks, Laura T., The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit and Closet Indexing, Fees, and Performance (February 13, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830207 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1830207

Contact Information

K. J. Martijn Cremers (Contact Author)
University of Notre Dame ( email )
P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States
Miguel Almeida Ferreira
Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Pedro P. Matos
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )
University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Laura T. Starks
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )
Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5899 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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