論權益交換與大股東持股揭露問題 (Equity Swaps and Disclosure of Shareholding of Major Shareholders)
Christopher C. Chen
Singapore Management University School of Law
August 1, 2008
法學新論，7期，2009年2月，頁105-131, 2009 (Journal of New Perspectives on Law, No. 7, pp. 105-131, 2009)
Equity swaps are derivative instruments linking to the performance of stocks or stock indices. In theory, equity swaps would result in the separation of economic interests of shareholders from their stock ownership. Equity swaps have also been used as a weapon in a battle for corporate control in other countries. Thus, the subsequent question is whether a party to an equity swap must disclose his swap positions pursuant to article 43-1 of the Securities Exchange Act if the amount of shares linked in the swap has passed a certain threshold. This paper argues that current disclosure rules under Taiwan law may cover circumstances where the swap counterparty holds physical shares as a hedge against his exposure to the equity swap. However, there might be a loophole if the counterparty does not hold the shares while the other party employs equity swaps to contend for corporate control. Thus, this paper argues that there is room to improve for the disclosure regime under article 43-6 in order to promote legal certainty and close down loopholes.
Note: Downloadable document is in Chinese.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: 權益交換、衍生性商品、揭露、購併、經營權爭奪 (Equity swap, disclosure, Securities Exchange Act article 43-1, corporate control, merger & acquisition)
JEL Classification: K10, K22Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 8, 2011
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