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Profitability of Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Price StickinessHamideh Esfahaniaffiliation not provided to SSRN April 5, 2011 Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 747 Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. We show that the merger incentive is determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 Keywords: Differential game, Sticky price JEL Classification: C73, D43, L13 working papers seriesDate posted: May 17, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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